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written permission of the author.The efﬁciency of government promotion of the tourism industry
1 Introduction
In many countries, it is very common for the government to assist the tourism industry.
Governments traditionally provide signiﬁcant support for tourism activities in the form of
promotion or provision and maintenance of infrastructure. This kind of assistance helps
to attract and maintain tourists.
The demand for the goods and services provided by the tourism industry is determined by
several factors such as disposable income, leisure time, population, and prices of related
goods. These factors are very difﬁcult to change. The easiest way to change demand is
to change people’s preferences through outside impacts such as promotional campaigns.
Many studies have been done to incorporate promotion or advertising into the analysis of
tourism demand (Crouch et al., 1992; Divisekera and Kulendran, 2006).
Promotion works well to attract more tourists because it provides information on desti-
nation characteristics and inﬂuences consumer preferences psychologically, which plays
an important role in purchase decision making over a long time. Although promotion
provides information about alternatives and may increase the price elasticities of demand
for most goods, it may not be true for tourism goods as tourism goods and services from
different places in the same country have their own characteristics and some are even
unique. For example, the Opera House can only be seen in Sydney and the Great Reef Bar-
rier can only be viewed around Cairns. Therefore, promotion for one type of tourism good
is exclusive to other kinds of tourism goods. The effectiveness of promotional campaigns
reinforces the market power for one type of tourism good by affecting purchase decision
making over time. In this sense, it may increase product differentiation and decrease the
price elasticity of demand.
This paper explores the effect of the promotion of tourism in a model with increasing
returns and monopolistic competition. An important feature of the tourism industry is
that some tourism goods are produced with increasing returns due to big ﬁxed-cost com-
ponents (the exploitation of natural scenery, the construction of infrastructure in places of
interests). Before full capacity, many facilities related to tourism, such as theaters, play-
grounds, hotels and transportation infrastructure, can be utilized at fairly low marginal
costs. There is no exclusion for the additional use of these facilities. The existence of ﬁxed
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costs is very important to the welfare analysis as it contributes to imperfectly competitive
market structures and therefore to non-competitive pricing (Spence, 1976).
With high ﬁxed costs, the average cost curve is downward sloping over the relevant range.
A perfectly-competitive ﬁrm will expand output until increasing returns no longer apply.
Thus we usually have monopolistic competition with price above marginal cost, which
leads to under-production compared with perfect competition. Free entry and exit leading
to the equality between price and average cost is assumed in the long-run equilibria.
Even with average-cost pricing, the industries with increasing returns still under-produce
relative to those industries with constant returns. The reason for this inefﬁciency is caused
by ignoring the implications of increasing returns. Each consumer takes the price as given
at whatever level and they will not consume more. In fact, if consumers buy more of this
good, the ﬁxed cost of producing this good will be spread over a larger number of units,
which results in a lower average cost and hence lower price for every consumer. But if the
effect of increasing returns is not taken into account by consumers, then the industry will
produce less than the socially desirable level. Therefore, subsidizing an industry operating
with increasing returns in the form of promotion will attract more consumption of that
good, which may increase efﬁciency.
On the other hand, if a government runs a promotional campaign funded by a tax on
consumers or other industries to keep a balanced budget, we must consider the effects
of the tax. From the perspective of the whole economy, it is difﬁcult to say whether the
promotion of tourism has net positive or negative effects on welfare. In economies with
imperfect competition, taxation affects the number of ﬁrms and output per ﬁrm. When
the non-tourism industry also exhibits increasing returns, the cost of taxation may be high.
This involves a comparison of degrees of increasing returns in the two industries. By
comparing the situation with promotion and the situation without promotion, we will
examine if a change in preferences induced by promotion of tourism has any impact on
welfare.
However, welfare can only be compared based on given preferences. Promotion changes
preferences and hence the utility function. Thus it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a criterion to see
if promotion is desirable. The welfare effects depend on whether promotion provides
information or if it is a pure shift of demand from non-tourism to tourism goods. If it is
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the former case, the new utility function with an increased preference parameter is the
true utility function. If the latter is the case, the original utility function should be true
utility function as consumers may not really prefer more tourism goods despite the fact
that they buy more. By classifying these two cases, utility levels at different equilibria can
be compared to ﬁnd out if promotion improves welfare.
2 The model without promotion
We will begin the analysis without promotion. The model in this paper is developed from
the Dixit-Stiglitz model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) of monopolistic competition to examine
the market solution between the tourism industry and the non-tourism industry.
2.1 Model speciﬁcation
Considering an economy with M identical consumers, each of them has the following
decision problem for tourism and non-tourism consumption. These two industries have































pj yj = w (budget function)
(1)
where α ∈ (0,1) and ρ1,ρ2 ∈ (0,1). α is the preference parameter. ρ1 and ρ2 indicate the
parameters of elasticity of substitution between each pair of consumption goods in the
tourism and non-tourism industry. pi and pj are the prices of tourism goods xi and non-
tourism goods yj. w is individual’s income. m and n represent the number of tourism and
non-tourism goods respectively. We assume that one ﬁrm only produces one type of good
under the condition of increasing returns, so m and n also indicate the number of ﬁrms
in the tourism and non-tourism industries respectively. Each consumer is a price taker
and her decision variables are m, n, xi and yj. We simplify this problem by assuming that
it is a symmetric function. As we consider the problem under the condition of different
degrees of increasing returns, we can model scale economies by assuming some ﬁxed cost
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and constant marginal cost to allow average cost to be falling over a relevant range. The
ﬁxed cost of tourism production is set as a1 and non-tourism production is set to be a2, all
commodities in the two industries have constant marginal cost b1 and b2.




































As the tourism industry and the non-tourism industry are both imperfectly competitive,
the ﬁrm’s decision problems in the two industries are similar. First, we consider the
individual ﬁrm’s decision problem in the tourism industry. In order to acquire the general
equilibrium values for a ﬁrm’s decision variables, we have to consider three conditions.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the monopolist to maximize proﬁt with respect to output
level or price is
MR= pi(1+1/(∂ ln xi/∂ lnpi)) = MC= b1 (4)







It is called the Yang-Heijdra formula (Yang and Heijdra, 1993). Substituting it into Equa-





In addition, free entry is allowed into the industry, which will drive the proﬁt of all ﬁrms
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to zero. The zero proﬁt condition implies
piXi = a1 + b1Xi (7)
Xi is the supply of the i-th tourism good. As market goods are assumed to be symmetric,
we have Xi = X, xi = x and pi = p for i = 1,2,...,n. And the market clearing condition is
Mx= X (8)
All the above conditions also exist for non-tourism production.
2.2 General equilibrium and comparative statics
Walras’ law says that in an economy with G commodities, equilibrium in any G−1 markets
implies equilibrium in all markets. Thus, for numerous markets, as long as the relative
prices between all goods in a given set of commodities remain unchanged, we may lump
all the commodities into two composite commodities — tourism goods and non-tourism
goods, according to the Hicks composite commodity theorem. Those goods consumed
by tourists are lumped together as tourism goods, the rest are lumped into non-tourism
goods. We may make a general equilibrium analysis on any one of the two composite
commodities (see Ng, 2004, p. 236–7). Combined with the market clearing condition, we
get the general equilibrium values of variables as follows since all the market goods in
























m = ρ1 +
Mαw(1−ρ1)
a1
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After obtaining the explicit solutions for general equilibrium values of various variables,
we may next examine the comparative statics by examining the effects of a change of

























































∂ρ 2. We must keep the values of x and y in Equation (9)
positive. Since the denominators in the equation for x and y are positive, the numerator
must also be positive for x and y to be positive. That means we have a1 < Mαw and
a2 < M(1−α)w. Economically, the ﬁxed cost must be less than the value of the preference
parameters for all consumers in an economy. Otherwise, a general value of preference is
not sufﬁcient to provide a viable economy if the size of the ﬁxed cost of market production





are in fact unambiguously negative.
Parameters ρ1 and ρ2 represent the elasticity of substitution between different goods in
the same sector. An increase of ρ1 and ρ2 means that it becomes easier to substitute one
good for another in one sector, and the variety of goods is less important for consumers.
Thus the number of market goods in the sector decreases. An increase in ﬁxed costs
(a1 and a2) reduces the number of market goods, as it deters more ﬁrms from entering
this industry. A higher preference parameter to the tourism product (α) will increase
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the number of goods in this market, and decrease the number of non-tourism goods. In
addition, a larger population increases the number of market goods. More goods, or more
variety of goods, can be afforded as the ﬁxed cost of each good is shared by more people.


































3 The model with promotion
3.1 Optimal output in the short run
To analyze the situation with promotion, we introduce government into the model, and
let it impose an income tax on consumers and subsidize the promotion of tourism. The
promotion ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax will raise the consumers’ preferences towards
tourism products. Since we are considering a change in preferences for tourism goods,
we assume that the preference parameter to tourism products increases by a proportion
of γ,f r o mα to α(1+γ). The preference parameter for non-tourism goods 1−α may not
change, but the relative preferences between the two goods have changed. t is the tax rate
imposed on individuals. γ is an increasing function of t, e.g. γ = Aln(1+t). The parameter
Arepresents the effectiveness of promotion, measuring how quickly γ changes with t. This
function implies that there is no change in consumer preferences if no tax is imposed, and
the preference parameter increases more with a higher tax but at a diminishing rate.
In the short run, it is possible for ﬁrms to make proﬁt, we let πx, πy imply proﬁts made by
tourism and non-tourism ﬁrms respectively. Since consumers can be seen as the owner
of ﬁrms’ proﬁt, tax and proﬁt have some effects on the consumers’ utility, so they are
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Using the proﬁt maximization rule MR= MC, market clearing condition and substituting
proﬁts of the tourism and non-tourism ﬁrms, πx = piX −(a1 + b1X) and πy = pjY −(a2 +
b2Y), into the constraint, we get the general equilibrium values of variables for tourism

























m = ρ1 +
M(1−ρ1)αw
a1




where γ = Aln(1+ t).
We ﬁnd that, compared with the original equilibrium, the output per ﬁrm in the tourism
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and non-tourism industry have changed while the price and the number of ﬁrms remain
unchanged. It is taken that the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in the short run, and when demand
for tourism goods and services increase, the output of individual ﬁrms increases. From
the Yang-Heijdra formula, the price for tourism goods is determined by the number of
ﬁrms and the elasticity of substitution. Since both variables do not change, the price will
not change either. According to Ng (1986), in terms of the isoelastic shift in demand, there
is no change in the price elasticity at any given price. With a horizontal and unchanged
marginal cost, we have no change in price, as proﬁt maximization requires p(1+
1
 )=MC.






























































3.2 Optimal output in the long run
Now, let us examine the situation with promotion in the long run. If there is no government
intervention, the monopoly power coming from increasing returns will not last long.
Positive proﬁt made by ﬁrms will attract potential ﬁrms to enter and negative proﬁt will
force current ﬁrms to exit. Free entry and exit drives the proﬁt of a marginal ﬁrm to zero
in the long run. The demand for individual ﬁrms is not clear, depending on the extent
of increased demand and the number of incumbent ﬁrms in the industry. The budget
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pj yj = w(1− t) (budget constraint)
(16)






























Using the conditions of zero proﬁt, proﬁt maximization MR= MC and market clearing,

































m = ρ1 +
Mα(1+γ)w(1− t)(1−ρ1)
a1(1+αγ)




where γ = Aln(1+ t).
Compared with the original equilibrium and the short-run equilibrium, all the decision
variables have changed. As free entry and exit is allowed in the long run, the number of
ﬁrms will change, which will affect the output per ﬁrm. Prices of products are decided
by the forces of changed demand and supply. These changes will move the economy to
a new equilibrium. Inserting the general equilibrium values of variables into the utility
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function in (16), we have


























































Promotion may shift individuals’ preferences. Once preferences change, it is difﬁcult to
ﬁnd a criterion to see if promotion is desirable. There are two cases to be considered for
welfare effects of the promotion of tourism. If the promotion provides some information
on destination choices to individuals and attracts some tourists, those tourists enjoy
beautiful scenery. But individuals do not realize that consuming more tourism goods and
services may improve their welfare, without complete information. In other words, the
increased preference parameter in the new utility function is not realized by individuals
who instead maximize the original utility function. In fact, they should maximize the new
utility function with the increased preference parameter. On the other hand, if promotion
only switches consumption from non-tourism to tourism goods, tourists may be tempted
by advertising to travel to some places even though they do not really want to go. In this
case, welfare should be evaluated in accordance with original preferences. Next, we will
analysis welfare effects based on the two cases individually.
4.1 Welfare analysis based on information provision
With real information, individuals receive beneﬁt from traveling that would not take place
otherwise. In this case, the new utility function with an increased preference parameter is
the true utility function. Utility at different equilibrium levels can be compared to ﬁnd out
the welfare effects of the promotion of tourism.
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We will give speciﬁc values to the variables in the utility function, according to their
economic meaning. We assume that α = 0.5, which means consumers have the same
preference to tourism and non-tourism goods before promotion. As some studies measur-
ing the effectiveness of government promotion of tourism have found that promotion is
successful in bringing tourists to a country (Webster, 2000; Webster and Ivanov, 2006), we
assume that A= 5. This is to guarantee that tax is effective at least initially in promoting
the tourism industry, given that the promotional effect has diminishing marginal returns.
With a tax rate t = 0.01, γ = Aln(1 + t)   0.05. This means that imposing a 1% tax can
change a consumer’s preference parameter to tourism goods by 5%, and it may cause a
positive proﬁt for tourism ﬁrms in the short run. Tax must not be too high, otherwise the
cost of promotion will be too big.
The economy is assumed to have a population with M = 10,000,000. Too small or too
big a population may make the economy not viable. We also assume that marginal costs
in the two industries are the same, b1 = b2 = 0.001. Fixed costs a1 and a2 must be large
enough to form barriers for entry to keep monopolistic power for incumbent ﬁrms and
make x > 1, as long as a1 < Mαw or a2 < M(1−α)w. With other things unchanged, only
if x > 1, will utility increase with preferences; otherwise, utility decreases with an increase
in preferences. The relative difference between ﬁxed cost and marginal cost imply the
decreasing extent of average total cost. We assume the elasticities of substitution between
each pair of goods in the two industries are equal, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5. Hence, the difference in
the degrees of increasing returns in the tourism industry and the non-tourism industry
depends on a comparison of variables a1 and a2. Given other variables, the higher the
ﬁxed cost, the larger is the cost to be diffused over the units of output. Therefore, the
average cost of producing one unit of good decreases more when the production increases,
leading to a higher degree of increasing returns.
We substitute values of variables into different utility functions, a1 = 1,000,000, a2 =
500,000, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5 and b1 = b2 = 0.01, α = 0.5, A = 5, t = 0.01. And the following
results are obtained.
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Variables px py x
Eq. without promotion 0.02000040 0.02000020 9.99960001
Short run Eq. with promotion 0.02000040 0.02000020 10.03746263
Long run Eq. with promotion 0.02000039 0.02000021 9.99960554
Variables ym n
Eq. without promotion 4.99990000 25000 50000
Short run Eq. with promotion 4.78097041 25000 50000
Long run Eq. with promotion 4.99989648 25351 48299
Variables πx πy u
Eq. without promotion 0 0 8838834763
Short run Eq. with promotion 3786 -21893 15177998005
Long run Eq. with promotion 0 0 15184171945
The above simulation results are obtained at different equilibrium levels. If the parameter
Ais big enough for a small tax to promote the tourism industry effectively, the demand
curve for tourism goods will shift to the right by x% to intersect with the downward-
sloping average cost curve in the short run. Demand curve d  becomes more elastic.
When marginal cost is horizontal and remains unchanged, the new proﬁt maximizing
equilibrium will involve a higher output and the same price, which is consistent with
equilibrium values in (14). With no change in price, individual ﬁrms may make a positive
proﬁt (shaded area in Figure 1). As the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, the output for individual
ﬁrms will increase with higher demand for tourism goods. This is a big incentive for
lobbying government to promote the tourism industry. However, given the value of other
variables, a smaller A is not effective in bringing positive proﬁts to tourism ﬁrms.
In the long run, potential ﬁrms will enter into the tourism industry seeing the huge proﬁt
earned by incumbent ﬁrms until all ﬁrms break even. The demand curve for individual
ﬁrms will shift left again to d  , which becomes more elastic as there are more ﬁrms in
the tourism market and consumers have more choices. This new demand curve will be
tangent to the lower point of the average cost curve, resulting in a lower price and higher
output at point B compared with point A. This is shown in the simulation results.
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Figure 1: Monopolistic ﬁrms in the short run and long run
However, the non-tourism industry is affected by income tax. With decreasing demand
for non-tourism goods, the demand curve which was tangent to the downward-sloping
average cost curve shifts to the left, and the ﬁrm makes a loss. This will lead to an exit of
ﬁrms, and demand faced by individual ﬁrms will increase, leading to a right shift of the
demand curve. But less competition in this industry makes the demand curve less elastic
and the demand curve will be tangent to the average cost curve at a higher point with
higher price and lower output.
Although tax on consumers will make the output and number of ﬁrms in the non-tourism
industry decrease, and the price for non-tourism goods increase, the negative effect of the
tax is overbalanced by the huge promotional effect on the tourism industry due to a lower
degree of increasing returns in the non-tourism industry. When the promotion of tourism
provides information of destination choices, an increasing demand for tourism goods
overcomes under-production in the tourism market. With tax imposed, consumers will
reduce their demand for non-tourism goods and services, releasing the labour input from
existing goods, which gives potential ﬁrms incentives to enter into the tourism market.
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Hence, the number of ﬁrms in the tourism market increases, consumers can get more
variety of tourism goods. Hence, the welfare level rises. This is what Doi and Futagami
(2004) show; namely, introducing speciﬁc taxes increases social welfare.
Next, we will look at how the tax rate affects welfare with promotion given the value
of other variables. The efﬁciency of promotion is inﬂuenced by the parameter Aand tax
rate t. A higher A and tax rate lead promotion to be more effective in improving welfare,
but the marginal effect is decreasing. It is obvious that a higher A for any given level of
tax rate changes preferences to a larger extent and improves welfare more. Tax is levied
to promote the tourism industry. For a ﬁxed A, welfare ﬁrst increases with the tax rate
and then decreases. The tax rate cannot be too low, otherwise it will not generate enough
promotional effect. The tax rate cannot be too high either, otherwise, it will discourage
the non-tourism industry. Therefore, there must be an optimal tax rate for welfare to be
maximised. Otherwise, the negative effects supercede the positive effects, leading to a
decrease of welfare. To see the changing tendency more clearly, we take the log of the
utility function. In the following 3-D ﬁgure, when parameter Ais small, the optimal tax
rate is lower. But with a higher level of A, the optimal tax rate is higher, which means
effective promotion can largely overcome the cost of income tax.
Figure 2: Optimal tax rate
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In addition, we examine how the change in variables affects the welfare level in the case
that promotion provides information. Through a series of simulations, we ﬁnd that at a
given level of the tax rate, when the degree of increasing returns in the tourism industry
becomes increasingly higher than that in the non-tourism industry, welfare with promotion
will be larger than welfare without promotion. It is not the case with a very low tax rate.
The tendency can be explained in this way. In Figure 3, when ﬁxed cost a2 of non-tourism
production decreases and ﬁxed cost of tourism production a1 remains unchanged, the gap
of degrees of increasing returns in the two industries is widening. The smaller the a2 and
the higher the tax rate, then the larger the welfare difference. This is because a decrease of
a2 means a lower degree of increasing returns in the non-tourism industry. The cost of
taxation is lower with a lower degree of increasing returns. Then the beneﬁt of promotion




























Figure 3: Welfare change with change in a2 and t
Based on the above results, we can acquire an important proposition.
Proposition 1 In the case with the provision of real information to consumers, the promotion of
tourism ﬁnanced by income tax may improve welfare both in the short run and long run, especially
if the tourism industry has a higher degree of increasing returns than the non-tourism industry.
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The equilibrium with promotion which provides real information is a Pareto improvement
compared with the equilibrium without promotion. This improvement is due to the
implications of increasing returns. At the equilibrium without promotion, the market
goods produced by tourism ﬁrms are priced at average cost. Under the condition of
increasing returns to scale, average cost pricing may result in some inefﬁciency and under-
production. Each consumer takes the price of each good as given, and assumes that no
matter how much they buy, the price will not be affected. Hence, the effect of increasing
returns is not taken into account. In fact, if all consumers buy more tourism goods, the
ﬁxed-cost component of producing this good will be spread over a larger number of units,
resulting in a lower average cost and hence lower price for every consumer. When the
gap in the degrees of increasing returns for the two industries enlarges, it is more efﬁcient
to promote the industry with a higher degree of increasing returns to move the market
outcome closer to the social optimum. Myles (1987, 1989), Doi and Futagami (2004) and
Ng and Zhang (2007) also support a subsidy to a sector with a higher degree of increasing
returns to improve welfare.
4.2 Welfare analysis based on a pure shift of demand
In the previous section, the welfare effects of promotion of tourism are analyzed in accor-
dance with the new utility function, assuming that promotion provides real information.
The simulation results show that promotion may improve individuals’ welfare. However,
promotion may simply shift individuals’ preferences, hence it is arbitrary to acquire the
conclusion that welfare increases with promotion. In traditional economic analysis, two
indifference curves do not cross. A higher indifference curve represents higher utility,
which is based on the same relative preferences. However, when relative preferences
change, this rule will not be satisﬁed. It is possible for two indifference curves to cross,
and a higher point does not mean a higher utility. Thus changes in utility do not give a
valid comparison. Through consumption of more tourism goods and less non-tourism
goods, we still cannot decide if the new combination leads to a higher level of welfare.
In Figure 4, point A is the combination of tourism and non-tourism goods on indifference
curve I1 without promotion. With a change in preferences, the new indifference curve
crosses with I1. The new combination caused by promotion can be at B, C, and D, but they
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cannot be compared with point A, as they are not on the same set of indifference curves.
We can draw subsidiary indifference curves going through these points, which have the
same relative preferences with I1. Any point on a higher indifference curve will have a
higher utility. Evaluated with original preferences, welfare with promotion may increase,
decrease or even be equal depending on the position of a new combination of tourism and
non-tourism goods.
Figure 4: Change in relative preferences
To make a valid comparison, we will substitute the equilibrium value of variables acquired
from the utility function with promotion into the utility function without promotion to
see the difference. Figure 5 shows that welfare with promotion is lower than welfare
without promotion given the speciﬁc value of variables. The new combination of two
kinds of goods is more likely at point B in Figure 4. In terms of original preferences,
the promotion of tourism reduces welfare. When the degree of increasing returns in
the tourism industry becomes relatively larger than that in the non-tourism industry, a
higher tax will lead to a bigger distortion in terms of original preferences. The negative
effect on the non-tourism industry will become much larger than the positive effect of
promotion on the tourism industry. This implies residents consume more tourism goods
and services with promotion, but they may not really prefer to in accordance to their
intrinsic preferences. The distorted consumption not only makes the non-tourism industry
deteriorate, but also inﬂuences consumers’ welfare. Therefore, from the standpoint of
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a whole society, promotion of tourism is not socially desirable evaluated with original














































Figure 5: Welfare change in terms of original preferences with change in a2 and t
We have Proposition 2 following the analysis:
Proposition 2 If the promotion of tourism results in a pure shift of demand, social welfare in
accordance with the original preferences is reduced.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the efﬁciency of publicly-funded promotion of the tourism industry.
Through a comparison of utility levels with and without promotion, we have shown
that a tax-funded promotion of tourism may overcome the inefﬁciency associated with
imperfect competition, provided that the tourism industry produces under a higher
degree of increasing returns than the non-tourism industry. In a market with monopolistic
competition, monopolistic ﬁrms may produce less than social optimum and charge a
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higher price for their products to maximize proﬁt. Government promotion may overcome
the problem of underproduction and move closer to the social optimum by utilizing the
implications of increasing returns. However, from the perspective of the whole economy,
this intervention may not be beneﬁcial. Although promotion is very useful in increasing
demand for tourism goods, the government has to impose a tax on consumers to keep the
budget balanced, which causes a reduction of non-tourism output and pushes the price
of non-tourism goods higher. The total effects depend on the comparison of degrees of
increasing returns in the two industries. If the tourism industry has a higher degree of
increasing returns than the non-tourism industry, then the beneﬁt of promotion of tourism
is more likely to exceed the negative effect, improving welfare. Otherwise, the negative
effect may exceed the beneﬁt, and the promotion of tourism may lower welfare.
An important point to notice is that welfare comparison should be based on a given
preference structure. Once promotion changes consumers’ preferences, changes in util-
ity may not provide a valid comparison of welfare. Here promotion changes relative
preferences between tourism and non-tourism goods. The result for welfare-improving
is acquired under the assumption that promotion provides real information. The new
utility function with promotion is maximized as consumers may not realize the beneﬁt of
traveling without complete information. A higher utility means that tourists will receive
more beneﬁt after enjoying the beautiful scenery. If promotion is a pure shift of demand
from tourism to non-tourism goods, a comparison of different equilibrium in terms of
original preferences has to be made. Measured with reference to the original preferences,
we ﬁnd that promotion of tourism reduces social welfare, unless the tourism sector has
a higher degree ...Fromthis perspective, the promotion of tourism may not be socially
desirable.
Clearly, it is difﬁcult for a government to measure which industry has a higher degree of
increasing returns. In some cases with information asymmetry, the promotion policy on an
industry with a high degree of increasing returns will open up a ﬂood-gate of rent-seeking
activities that are likely to waste more resources of the society. The beneﬁt of promotion
may be overbalanced by the cost of taxation and the resources spent on rent seeking. In
fact, it is not easy to greatly change preferences by promotion alone and it is more difﬁcult
to control the variable to a range that is exactly what we desire, for example, to decide the
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optimal tax rate to ﬁnance the promotion of tourism. However, due to huge proﬁt brought
by promotion in the short run, there is a high incentive for tourism ﬁrms to require more
subsidies from the government. Although promotion may bring prosperity to the tourism
industry, we must recognize that increasing the demand for tourism goods and services
needs some sacriﬁce from other industries. Therefore, promotion has double-sided effects
on social welfare. Government cannot blindly take action to ﬁnance promotion in the
interest of only some groups. It is necessary to justify the applicability of promotion policy
to the economy as a whole before taking any policy actions.
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